6
European Civil Society’s
Conundrum: Public Spheres,
Identities and the Challenge
of Politicisation
Karel B. Müller
Abstract This work draws upon the novel theoretical framework of European
civil society which is based on the complementary concept of civil
society. It claims that relations between the Europeanised public spheres,
political identities and the politicisation of the EU present an intricate and
crucial conundrum of the European civil society. While applying such a
theoretical framework this work interprets the Europeanisation of identities,
public spheres and national polities as mutually reflexive processes.
The well-respected concept of positive identity (Erikson) and the civil code
of collective identity (Shils) are deployed in order to understand dynamics
between the public sphere and identities trans/formations. Finally, the concept
of active border is introduced as the key component of the European
civil society, and as a vital nexus within the conceptual cluster of identity,
the public sphere and the Europeanisation.
Keywords: European civil society, European public sphere, European
identity, Europeanisation, active border, EU
Introduction
Both the EU´s representatives (and the EU´s documents) and many
civil society scholars predominantly conceptualise a European civil society
as interest groups and social movements (or, just as NGOs) operating
in the European transnational context.1
Disadvantages of such
reductionist conceptualisation are plentiful, but first of all it suffers
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from the lack of sociological dynamism and ignores a reflexive-like nature
in relations between political institutions and social agency.
The aim of this article is to apply a novel theoretical framework of a
European civil society. The theoretical background for that is grounded
in the complementary approach towards the civil society concept
(which is inspired mainly by Tocqueville’s social theory and Giddens
theory of reflexive modernity), and which I have presented earlier.2
To start with, I will summarise a robust normative perspective on the
concept of civil society. On the silhouette of the outlined normative
perspective I will draw the major institutional and socio-cultural preconditions
of an emerging civil society in the (European) transnational
context. I believe that this view is capable of grasping the issue in its
complexity and explaining structural aspects of the problem, whilst
taking into account the situation of specific social actors in its broader
contextual framework.
In the second step I will discuss a particular aspect of the European
civil society: reflexive relations between the construction of European
public sphere, the formation of transnational identities and the politicisation
of the EU. Relations between public sphere, collective identity
and the claim of politicisation present an intricate and puzzling conundrum
of a European civil society. Conventional approach towards
relations between public sphere, collective identity and polity has been
imbued by a sort of essentialism. Until recently, such approach has
been very salient in European studies discourse and has utterly dominated
laypersons public debates on European integration. It presumes
that the formation of the transnational public sphere is the precondition
for the emergence of a transnational (European) polity, and that
the formation of transnational (European) collective identities is the
necessary precondition for the emergence of transnational (European)
public sphere. In other words, such approach contends that if there is
no collective identity, there cannot be any public sphere and if there
is no public sphere, there cannot be any democratic polity. This linear-like
logic among “identities – public spheres – polities” has been
particularly salient in discussions about, for instance, the so called
democratic deficit, or the no-demos debates.
Utilising the theoretical background of the complementary concept
of civil society, the main structural argument of this article asserts that
Europeanisation of identities, public spheres and nation states are parallel
and mutually reflexive processes. I reinforce the argument pre-
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sented and empirically supported by Thomas Risse that the formation
of Europeanised public spheres and identities has been feeding from
each other.3
I believe that the Europeanisation of public spheres and
identities could complement each other towards a more effective and
accountable democratic governance in the EU. Furthermore, I defend
and develop the argument which has been suggested by many schol-
ars,4
that a deeper politicisation of the EU could reinforce the Europeanisation
of both public spheres and identities.5
To sum up, applying the complementary account of the European
civil society, I will assert the four following hypotheses: 1) the formation
of the European public sphere and the Europeanisation of public
spheres in the EU are synergic and parallel processes; 2) the Europeanisation
of public spheres is conducive for Europeanisation of identities,
and porous active borders are the key component of these processes; 3)
the Europeanisation of public spheres could be interpreted as a form
of re/politicisation of public spheres in the EU; in other words the deficit
of a single European public sphere is actually the deficit of public
spheres in the EU; and 4) the politicisation of the EU could reinforce
the Europeanisation of public spheres and collective identities.
The Complementary Account on the European Civil
Society
In order to follow the four above mentioned hypotheses, the complementary
theory of European civil society is important for both theoretical
and empirical analysis. This framework of analysis offers the
broad sociological context in which questions about the Europeanisation
should be discussed in order to identify and understand relations
between identities, public spheres and polities’ trans/formations.
Reconstructing Tocqueville’s social theory we can find the four functional
dimensions between civil society and democratic polity: defensive,
participative, legitimising, and integrative dimensions.6
These
four functional dimensions are cited with various degrees of emphasis
by all authors dealing with the issue of civil society; most distinctively
by authors such as Taylor or Walzer.7
Let us summarise these four di-
mensions.
Civil society should above all be capable of acting as a defence
against the potential expansionism of political power. It is part of the
European historical experience that every power, often in the name
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European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
of efficiency and the ability to mobilise itself, maintains a tendency to
gravitate towards centralisation; this increases the risk of the abuse of
power. This is where the defensive function of civil society comes into
play.
A second dimension is the participative function. Civil society ought
to facilitate the more effective involvement of citizens in the public
sphere than established political parties. Broadly based civic participation
may consist of the massive mobilisation of resources that is facilitated
by the widespread dissemination of information and knowledge.
The legitimising function of civil society is based on the fact that
civil society through its independence and autonomy creates the social
resources for political power and provides democratic legitimacy
to the government (or to the state). The power of the government is
only legitimate when it is able to enjoy the trust of its citizens. The
extra-political and independent status of civil society guarantees that
political power is executed ‘rationally’. Public opinion has a binding
and normative character for political power. But in order to be able
to form public opinion, civil society must constitute a relatively large
structure within which social interests and priorities are consistently
articulated, agreed upon, and verified.
The last, but by no means the least important expectation associated
with civil society is the fact that, within it, relationships of affinity
and loyalty are formed, and this is civil society’s integrative function.
Through repeated involvement in the workings of civil society citizens
eventually come to realise that in order for their voice to be heard and
their interests to be taken into account they need to join forces with
others. This in turn engenders a sense of belonging to or affinity with
an interest group. More broadly there then emerges a sense of belonging
to a broader societal context and identifying with the given political
system. Civil society creates room for the reproduction of shared
symbols, values, and norms.
Inspired by Giddens’ approach to an analysis of the nature of contemporary
modern societies,8
I define the functional dimensions in
relations between civil society and the democratic state as depicted
below in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Functional Dimensions in Relations between Civil Society and
Democratic Polity
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In this figure the outer circle represents the whole of civil society,
and the small circle around the centre represents the sphere of political
power, i.e. the sphere of the control of information and social
surveillance. The above mentioned functions of civil society can be
plotted in the figure as follows: at the top end of the vertical axis (of
“agency”) there is the protective or defensive function, which is an analogy
of the concept of ‘negative freedom’ (Giddens calls it emancipatory
politics).9
At the opposite end of the vertical axis is the participative
function, which, conversely, corresponds to the concept of ‘positive
freedom’ (corresponding to Giddens’ ‘life politics’). The legitimising
function of civil society is at the right end of the horizontal axis (of
“trust”), the entire right half of which indicates the mutual dependency
and interconnectedness of civil society and the democratic polity. At
the left end of the horizontal axis there is social integration, the value
which expresses the fact that civil society is capable of reproducing and
integrating itself as a society, but also illustrates the fact that civil society
is integrated within the framework of a single political system.10
Silhouetted against Figure 1 it is possible to structure the concept
of a European civil society. Four dimensions of civil society on a European
level correspond to the following notions: along the vertical
axis of “agency” these are (1) the European public sphere, and (2) multilevel
civil society, and along the horizontal axis of “trust” these are (3)
multilevel (polycentric) governance, and (4) European identity. Each
of these dimensions represents a vast research field which encompasses
a cluster of problems and questions. The following Figure 2 suggests
a conceptual interpretative framework for both a theoretical and
empirical analysis of the dynamics and mutual relations between the
above mentioned four dimensions. In the following, I will focus on the
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Müller
conceptual frameworks of the European public sphere and European
identity as well as their links in relation to the sphere of political power
and to the context of individual actors.
Figure 2: Dimensions of European Civil Society
Sphere of European Publics (hypothesis 1)
Concerns about democracy are one of the most important reasons
why we should care about transforming collective identities and public
spheres in Europe in the first place. Democracy without a public and
without shared sense of community of communication is most likely
not a viable option.11
Let us start with the first hypothesis, which asserts
that the formation of the European public sphere and the Europeanisation
of public spheres in the EU are synergic and parallel processes.
It has been frequently argued and demonstrated that the “psychological
existence” of the EU as an imagined community is still lacking,
compared to well- established nation states. Nevertheless, there is
plenty of empirical evidence that, particularly in the last two decades,
the EU has seen some significant changes and shifts in the formation
of its collective identity as well as in the transformation of its public
spheres. Due to constitutional debates, issues of the Euro implementation,
Eastern enlargements and the world economic and the Euro
currency crises, the symbolic visibility of the EU, in addition to the
media reporting on a “European common concerns” have increased
significantly. As Koopmans and Statham research has shown, by comparison
to national actors, European institutions and politics has been
adequately visible.12
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A Conceptual Account of the European Public Sphere
Nevertheless, it seems true that the European public sphere is still
rather weak and underdeveloped on the one hand, but on the other,
there is little doubt that the last two decades have definitely “dissolved
the marriage” between the state and its public sphere. Nation states
have lost their monopolies in controlling flows of social interactions
and creating a “meaningful” framework of communications. Furthermore,
recent developments have even questioned the crucial role of
the public sphere as the guarantor of political power being exercised
in a reasonable and accountable manner.13
Although main stream public
opinion is not formed on the basis of critical deliberation, it still
remains the major political force which is to be respected and looked
after. The whole essence of democracy stands and fails with public
opinion, which should not be taken for granted. We should not expect
that public opinion simply exists (as an aggregate of private opinions).
Rather, we need to ask how to treat the values of liberal democracy
within the framing and shaping conditions and the processes of formation
of public opinion.
The transformation of the nation state, which has been, as Stuart
Hall pointed out,14
a crucial system of cultural representation, is a part
of the complex shifting between public and private spheres, or, as one
could argue, a part of the decline of the public sphere. The claim for
the emergence of the European public sphere is nothing less than the
claim for a new concept of the public sphere itself.15
As Jeffrey Alexander
put it:
We need a new concept of civil society as a civil sphere, a world
of values and institutions that generates capacity for social
criticism and democratic integration at the same time. Such
a sphere relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we
do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience,
because of our persuasive commitment to a common
secular faith.16
I agree with Eriksen and Fossum who claim that arguments about
the weakness of the European public sphere are usually imbued by an
insufficient conceptual grasp.17
Arguments about the existence or nonexistence
of the European public sphere are dependent upon the conceptualisation
of the notion. Primarily we should not conceptualise
the European public sphere as a separate entity. We should talk about
the Europeanisation of particular and various public spheres,18
as well
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European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
as about an overarching European public sphere.
Social scientists recognise that the plurality of both conflicting and
complementary public spheres has been the very essence of emerging
public spheres from the early modernity.19
Therefore, using the singular
in relation to the public sphere is, to say the least, misleading.
Public life in a pluralistic society cannot take place within a singular
public sphere. That is the way Craig Calhoun suggests using the notion
of a “sphere of publics” rather than “public sphere.”20
The same
argument submits Nancy Fraser who asserts that the proliferation of
public spheres’ plurality should not be perceived as a dangerous sign of
social cleavage, nor as a threat to democracy.21
Mutual respect and recognition
among actors from competitive public spheres and discourses,
as Fraser convincingly proved while analysing the emergence of the
feminist public, this meant “more” not “less” democracy.22
This argument is very relevant with respect to the conceptualisation
of a European public sphere. Similar to the institutionalisation of political
discussion at the nation state level, a European public sphere is
only conceivable as an amalgam of multiple, multilevel, complementary,
divergent and convergent public spheres, as a sphere of European
publics. Such plurality of Europeanised public spheres does not rule
out the emergence of an overarching public sphere on a supranational
level, but such a public sphere should not be singled out as the
only sign of a European public sphere. The very principle of democracy
implies the formation of public spheres around decision-making
centres.23
Major preconditions for such an overarching public sphere
is, according to Fraser,24
sufficient consensus about “expressive forms”
and “persuasion protocol” which guarantee meaningful discussions
and openness for agreements. Meaningful public discussion requires
a shared framework of discursive environment, where conflicts and
interests are represented and managed.
An Operational Account of the European Public Sphere
More specifically towards normative dimension of the notion, Habermas
operationalised a European public sphere as ‘a public political
sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on
the same topics of the same relevance.’25
Inspired by him, Klaus Eder
and Cathleen Kantner have formulated the following criteria of a Eu-
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ropean public sphere: there is a European public sphere if there are
discussed the same issues at the same time with the same criteria of
relevance (or, with the same frame of reference).26
These criteria presume
that a transnational European public sphere can be built through
the Europeanisation of the various national media discourses. By “the
same frame of reference” one means consent about conflicting interpretations
of a given problem. This criterion corresponds with what
Fraser calls as consensus about “expressive forms” and “persuasion pro-
tocol.”27
As Risse points out, we have to agree on what the problem is
or, at least, which potential interpretations of the problem exist so that
we know what we are talking about.28
By the same criteria of relevance
is not meant a European perspective based on a European identity, but
a common interpretation of the problem that includes controversial
opinions on the particular question.
As for the empirical research on the European public sphere which
follows the above mentioned criteria, recent surveys indicate three firm
outcomes: (1) that media reporting on “European affairs” in national
media discourses has been until quite recently rather sparse, bleak and
very often negative,29
although (2) that the last 20 years showed that
national media have not only increased their coverage of EU policies
and events,30
but they are, to a great extent, discussing the same issues
at the same time and (3) that frames of reference and meaning structures
did not vary much across national discourses.31
Following the Eder/Kantner criteria, we might conclude that sizeably
increased salience of the EU affairs in the national media, as well
as similarities in time and frames of reference indicate that the criteria
for the Europeanised public sphere have been met.32
Despite that, there
have been ongoing concerns, as some authors rightly argued,33
that political
communication within the EU has suffered huge mediatic deficit,
which maintains a great deal of civic ignorance and withdrawal from
politics.34
The multiple EUs crisis certainly has changed such minimal visibility
of the EU since heuristic of the crisis naturally attracts much more
media attention.35
Although, as Neverla pointed out,36
media prefer
mediation of crises impacts over crises causes and remedies. Koopmans
and Statham research which employed the innovative method
of claims analysis shows, that the EU does not remain invisible but the
sphere of European publics remains insufficiently inclusive.37
Governments
and media actors are grossly overrepresented, to the detriment
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of other interest groups. In the face of the on-going euro crisis, we may
wonder whether these findings continue to hold.
Let us move towards the second hypothesis which asserts that the
Europeanisation of public spheres is conducive for the Europeanisation
of identities, and that porous active borders are the key component
of these trans/forming processes.
Europeanised Identities, Public Spheres and Active
Borders (Hypothesis 2)
Risse adds to the Eder/Kantner criteria of a European public sphere the
third criterion with three indicators, and which takes up the debate
about the relations between collective identities and the trans/formation
of public spheres.38
The first indicator of his criterion concerns
the degree to which fellow European citizens are no longer treated as
“foreigners”, but as legitimate speakers. With respect to the normative
dimension of the notion of public sphere, participant from over the
border should not be treated as “foreigners” interfering domestic af-
fairs.39
Second indicator of his criterion suggests that actors should be
able to operate within a common discourse and to form a common
arena of communication which stretches across the porous borders of
competing national discourses. The European public sphere assumes
that actors treat each other as legitimate speakers in the many public
spheres within the EU as opposed to creating boundaries using self/
other distinctions. His third indicator concerns about framing the
particular issues as common European problems. Such an emerging
European community of communication refers to the development
of a common European perspective on issues of European concern. It
does not mean that speakers in the transnational public sphere adopt a
neutral position above partisanship or that they agree on the issues at
stake. It rather means that speakers refer to the EU, or Europe, as “us”
and debating a particular issue as issues of common European con-
cern.40
In terms of the empirical research following the above mentioned
criterion (and its three indicators), there seem to be too few surveys to
draw a robust conclusion. That opens doors for a more speculative approach.
The older literature on public spheres assumed that identity is
a precondition for its emergence. This argument is based on the essen-
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tialist assumption that citizens enter the public sphere with a formed
identity, positions, and interest. If there is no collective identity, there
cannot be any public sphere.41
Such an approach underestimates the
role of the public sphere in the re/construction of identities. It is reasonable
to believe that public spheres constitute the site where identities
have emerged and where they are being de/constructed and re/
constructed. People’s positions, orientations and identities are formed,
could be formed, and, as proponents of deliberative democracy suggest,
should be formed within communicative interactions, while
being confronted with a varieties of re/presentations of interests and
opinions.42
The Europeanisation of public spheres and the emergence
of transnational identities (communities of communication) are fairly
recent phenomena, which have followed rather then led the process of
European integration.43
Following Risses third criterion I would claim that the Europeanisation
of public spheres is determined by emergence of active borders.
Europeans need to learn how to treat both territorial and symbolic
borders as specific cultural forms which enable to exercise and practise
cross border communication. Such communication should allow for a
better understanding of difference rather than constructing or reproducing
it. Active borders should support and produce both public criticism
and social integration without generating antagonism towards
those from “over borders.” In other words, active borders should treat
such cultural encounters which support unity in diversity and avoids
polarisation.44
Active borders should guarantee a common discursive
space that allows the free re/construction of identities and the on-going
cultural pluralisation. The concept of active border presumes the
post-representational approach to culture, which is not something
that is border lined, but permanently opens to the process of social
self-creation, and which does not stress inside/outside dimensions.
With respect to the inside/outside (us/them) dimensions of identity,
the concept of active border could as well be grafted upon the typology
of Edward Shils,45
which distinguishes the three codes of collective
identity: primordial, sacred and civil. The active border is characterised
by porous and permeable number of access points or channels,
whereas the passive border is characterised by a communicational impermeability.
While the primordial code of collective identity has borders,
which are passive on both of its sides, the sacred code of collective
identity implies the border, which is active on its outer side (inward)
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European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
and passive on its inner side (outward); integration through assimilation
is feasible. The assimilation entails adapting cultural forms and
patterns, rather than diluting established practices and adhering to
practices that are foreign to a given “inside” culture. Finally, the civil
code of collective identity seeks to foster active borders on both of its
sides (inbound and outbound).
Active borders determine a mutual communication and understanding
of others, as opposed to passive borders that seduce to the
stereotypical labelling, defining and preserving polarity. The concept
of active border seeks for such cultural and institutional preconditions
existing on both sides of a border which guarantee a shared discursive
space for actors from both sides. The concept of active border claims
to present a nexus which connects the reflexive dynamics between
identities, public spheres and polities towards democratic integration,
social criticism and public learning.
Methods of Communication and European Positive
Identities
The concept of European political identity (demos) is crucial for the
understanding of the European public sphere. Following Risse’s third
criterion of Europeanised public spheres and the concept of active
borders, it seems productive to employ into our conceptual cluster the
concept of positive/negative identity.46
In resonance with Risses third
criterion I suggest that European identity should be primarily seen as a
complex of multiple positive identities which encapsulates an attempt
to overcome the biasness of national identities and consciousness.47
The EU’s need for an active search for legitimacy could prove, after
all, to be an advantage of the EU over national governments, which
tend to rely on static social segments and nested collective identities.48
National identities are, to great extent, defined as negative identities.49
The EU should strive to maintain and foster the environment which
allows the reflexive and open identity formation. It should foster a
means of reducing pathological tendencies in the identity formation.
European civil society could be defined as a niche providing these very
resources, and creating chances for the open and reflexive identity
formation based on the principles of competence and social integrity.
Such situation could provide the method for creating European identities,
which I suggest to perceive – with respect to an individual agency
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and a prescriptive (and dynamic) dimension of identity (aspirations)
– rather than as a singular collective identity, as (strive for) multiple
(and complementary) positive identities. Such conditions could work
towards the de/re/construction of collective identities in Europe; and
could work towards invoking the European identity in a stronger sense,
if needed. Positive identities are most likely to work towards active
borders and complementary inclusive identities and negative identities
towards passive borders, exclusive identities and discrimination.
After all, such assumptions are echoed in some empirical research.
Risse convincingly interprets the spread of Euroscepticism as a specific
sign of Europeanisation itself; even most adamant opponents
of the EU also take it for granted nowadays.50
At the same time, the
Europeanised identities come in “national colours” too, as they resonate
with national symbols and narratives in many different ways. The
Europeanisation of national identities in the elite discourse does not
necessarily result in a uniform and homogenous European identity; it
rather comes within elements of predominantly complementary and
inclusive (positive) identities.51
Empirical research supports another assumption, and that is that
Europeanised public discourse is showing a new transnational cleav-
age.52
Rather than choose “the EU – yes/no,” two different and competing
visions of the EU stand out. On the one hand, there is a vision of
positive identity Europe; open, inclusive and cosmopolitan Europe that
embodies the values of liberalism, enlightenment and discursive ethics.
On the other hand there is a vision of negative identity Europe which is
closed and exclusionary “fortress of Europe” which is based on the essentialist
interpretation of the Christian heritage and forging a distinct
European nationalism; such nationalism is less connected to the nation
state and increasingly connected to the EU itself. This cleavage is
increasingly visible in many member states and, according to Risse, is
likely to structure the politicisation of European affairs in the future.53
European integration generates winners and losers. On average, the
winners have been the younger, the better educated, and wealthier and
the more politically informed part of the population, their European
identity is strongly correlated with cosmopolitan and other liberal
values.54
The winners were able to exploit the opportunities of transnational
mobility and as a result, they identify with the EU. “Open”
Europeans enjoy, treat and explore active porous borders of collective
identities and discourses throughout their competence and commu-
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Müller
nicative skills. On average the losers have been those who profit less
from economic integration and find it distressing to handle the pressure
of transnational markets, they were older and less educated, do
not travelled very much and have less exposure to foreigners than the
winners; “Closed” Europeans tend to guard and foster passive impermeable
borders of their nested and stereotypical identities and discours-
es.55
We may wonder, whether and how the economic crises in the EU
is going to change positions and attributes of these “open” and “closed”
Europeans .
Nevertheless, I claim that European identities shall not be conceived
in conventional terms. The main characteristics of European identity
should not be a definition of “borders” by creating the dichotomy
of “us” and “them.” In what sense identities could be comprehended
as post-conventional? To build complementary, multiple and positive
identities is feasible and imaginable only through specific methods of
civil, multi- and transnational communication. As Giddens argues, in
the condition of radicalised modernity civic engagement, communication
and participation, which are recognised as fair and open, create
crucial preconditions for strengthening and establishing bonds of belonging
and solidarity, and therefore positive identities.56
The concept of European identity as specific means and rules of
communication, dialogue and participation presumes a post-conventional
procedure-like concept of identity with a dominance of the civil
code elements in collective identity; hence the claim of constitutional
patriotism comes into play and its emphasis on the value of rules in
the process of communication.57
As Outhwaite puts it,58
the procedures
of not reaching consensus are as important (if not more) as the procedures
of reaching consensus, and they should be recognised as a key
factor of European political culture and as a decisive precondition to
form a collective identity in any stronger sense. Simply, put the character
of decision-making processes and of the processes within civil
society, which are recognised by their participants as fair and open,
matters more, in some sense, than the particular outcomes of these
processes.
Since modern societies are featured by a complex reorganisation
of time-space relations, it is more accurate to comprehend society as
an open system of communication, rather than as an integrated social
system of shared meanings and morals which is embedded in a
local context. Societies are nowadays, first of all, communicating so-
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cieties, networks of mobility, and flows and social communication.59
Therefore identities, including European ones, should be understood
as a project, whose main objective is active participation in the process
of fair and open communication within spheres of European publics.
Communication itself could (and should) be the main overarching defining
characteristic of European identities, which resembles, as Stuart
Hall brilliantly pointed out, “routes” rather than “roots.”60
So far we have dealt with the first two hypotheses. I argued in favour
of the claim that the formation of the European public sphere
and the Europeanisation of public spheres in the EU are synergic and
parallel processes, and that the Europeanisation of public spheres is
conducive for the Europeanisation of identities. I introduced the concept
of active border which plays the key role in these processes and
creates a nexus between identities and public sphere transformations.
Let us now focus on the 3rd
and 4th
hypotheses which assume that the
Europeanisation of public spheres could be interpreted as a form of re/
politicisation of public spheres in Europe, and that the politicisation
of the EU could further support the Europeanisation of public spheres
and collective identities in Europe.
Politicisation, Public Spheres and Political Identities (Hypotheses
3 and 4)
Although empirical findings suggest that we can observe a gradual
emergence of the Europeanised public spheres which provide sites
where the Europeanised identities are re/constructed,61
according to
many authoritative scholars in the field,62
democracy in the EU, primary,
does not suffer from the lack of a public sphere but from the lack of
a political sphere.
Reinforcing the argument about reflexive relations between Europeanised
public spheres and political identity (demos), we can employ the
phenomenological analysis of the dynamics between the public sphere
and political identities under communist regimes in CEE.63
Such interpretation
offers some possible clues for understanding the intrinsic
affinity between the public sphere and the formation of political iden-
tities.
Is the EU Laggard in Political Modernisation?
Among the major deficits of the Communist regimes was the absence
of the public sphere, which became a tool of social surveillance used
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European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
by Communist parties. The public sphere presents the cornerstone of
political modernity and a crucial structural precondition enabling the
formation and re/presentation of political positions and identities.64
Without the arena for political contention, articulating conflicting issues
during Communism was confined to the private sphere only. This
situation, as Sztompka argued, did not allow for the institutionalisation
of mechanisms needed for the civil resolution of existing conflicts,
which contributed to accumulation of social tensions and hampered
the formation of adequate political identities.65
The ultimate loyalty, or
subversive attitude, towards the political regime was the only alternative
for any political agency. With no public sphere accessible to them,
people were unable to interpret experiences of their everyday life as
politically relevant; therefore there was no room for the formation of
political identities.66
Where this analysis leaves us with respect to the Europeanisation
of public spheres and identities? It indicates two general tendencies. 1)
The lack of Europeanised public spheres has not allowed the forming
of cross border political identities, which 2) only stokes the fire of Euroscepticism
since people can only express either “ultimate loyalty” or
“subversive attitude” towards an opaque technocratic machine of the
EU. Simply put, the EU underperforms with respect to political moder-
nity.67
In term of de-politicisation we have to bear in mind that the elitist
approach towards integration has always been the norm and it has
caused no problems as long as the “permissive consensus” was providing
sufficient public support. The EU integration has never been
an openly and publicly politicised project. Nevertheless, nowadays we
may identify two crucial and mutually interconnected depoliticising
forces within the EU politics. The first is related to its institutional
design, the second, to the political culture of European elites.68
To start with the second, I agree with Risse that mainstream political
parties are not well prepared for politicisation of the EU.69
By leaving
the politicisation of the EU to Eurosceptics, mainstream political
parties are risking what they wanted to prevent – declining support
for the EU. Controversies, discussions and polarised debates are part
of vibrant public spheres, as long as speakers and audiences respect
one another as part of a community of communication.70
As for the
first reason, as Jiří Přibáň argues,71
the EU has been symbolically constructed
as a civil alternative to ethnic nationalism. This became very
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obvious in the course of the Eastern enlargement. The EU ‘politics of
de-politicisation’ has evolved into a set of institutional instruments for
consensual national and international policy-making based on permanent
negotiations and compromises. Consequently, political contention
has been replaced by legal and bureaucratic procedures leaving
little room for EU-scale democracy; this is why Přibáň critically calls
the EU a legalistic project.72
His analysis reveals that the European shift
towards de-politicisation and technocratic legalisation that has been
for the most of its history, appreciated by many as a major advantage of
the EU, could be at the same time a very serious limitation, pitfall and
shortcoming for its future and further democratisation.
Habermas himself pointed out in his famous book on Öffentlichkeit
that the crucial precondition for the public sphere to emerge was the
legal installation of permanent political opposition, which heralded
the emergence of the modern political sphere.73
Permanent political
opposition served as guarantor of a vital and independent public
sphere, which provided a public arena for articulating relevant positions,
and created a reservoir of discursive, organisational and symbolic
forms, which people could identify with. Political aspects of everyday
life could then be transferred into articulated and represented political
orientations and identities within the public sphere.
Polarisation and contention are important preconditions for the
emergence of Europeanised public spheres. European public spheres
come into being when people discuss about (European) controversial
issues. The politicisation of European affairs, analogously to identities
and public spheres, is likely to take place through the Europeanisation
of domestic politics.74
EU affairs must become part of “normal
politics.”75
Given the scale of de-politicisation within national public
spheres (driven also by the tabloid media and political populism), the
Europeanisation of domestic politics can be interpreted as a form of
re-politicisation of public spheres in Europe. The re-politicisation of
the public sphere should be facilitated and carried out through treating
the active borders between diverse discourses and identities. As
Vivien Schmidt described pointedly,76
the EU suffers a democratic deficit
from having “policies without politics”, and the national states suffer
from institutional incapacity by having “politics without policies”,
and this is not good news for European democracy and civil societies.
This epitomises a crucial incongruity between localities where mass
politics and political mobilisation take place and where decisions are
23
European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
made.77
This situation fosters extreme polarisation of “ultimate loyalty” on
the on hand, and “subversive attitude” on the other. This extreme polarisation
of public opinions in Europe support the formation of passive
borders, and this is furthermore exacerbated by the absence of
swinging dynamics between government and opposition, which epitomises
a rejuvenating capacity of any democratic polity to maintain
public trust and to reduce civic discontent or frustration. As Hix put
it, in a democracy when voters are dissatisfied with their situation they
do not blame the whole system, but the incumbent government.78
On
the other hand, the EU citizens who disagree with EU policies do not
manage to identify a governing and responsible coalitions, or any other
political subject which could replace it; therefore they have only one
option – to blame the EU as the whole.
Many social scientists support the argument that neutralising the
politics of unanimous consensus presents a major obstacle to further
democratisation of the EU, and it stifles the emergence of media and a
public sphere at the same time.79
Politicisation of the EU would enable
re/presentation of conflicting arguments and interests which would
bring the attention of the media and help to reduce the above mentioned
deficit of information and political communication.
In other words, without a proper political sphere and arena of political
contention in the EU we cannot expect a strengthening of Europeanised
public spheres and political identities. And without Europeanised
public spheres, relevant social conflicts cannot be properly re/
presented and institutionalised. This undermines possibilities to hold
on to democratic decision making, and to form a democratic political
will beyond the nation state. Without such preconditions, we only
risk the growth of social pressure, and that political orientations and
identities will only be formed in the extreme positions of acceptance
or resistance. After all, the available data show,80
indeed, that such extreme
positions are common among EU citizens. In the face of the current
euro crisis, both visibility and contention of EU affairs seem more
prominent than ever, and it still remains to be seen whether and how
the dynamic of euro crisis impacts relations between public spheres,
polities and identities trans/formation in Europe.
Conclusion
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The main argument of this paper asserts that the Europeanisation of
identities, the Europeanisation of public spheres and the Europeanisation
of nation states are to a great extent parallel and mutually reflexive
processes which have been feeding from each other and could
complement each other towards a more legitimate and effective governance
in the EU. Building the European framework of democratic
governance, developing the European public sphere and encouraging
the European identity/ties (demos) formation are intrinsically connected
processes. The novel concept of European civil society also suggests
that the democratic deficit of the EU has both institutional and socio-cultural
aspects which affect each other in reflexive relations. This
framework of analysis offers the broad sociological context in which
questions about the Europeanisation of public spheres and identities
should be discussed in order to interpret and understand relations between
identities, public spheres and polities’ trans/formations.
The concept of active border (which is both normative and analytical)
was interpreted as the key component for the formation of European
civil society. The active border allows synergic trans/formation
of public spheres and identities in order to construct the civil code
of collective identity. The civil code is based on common discursive
space which works towards democratic inclusion and public learning,
and which fosters positive and complementary identities. The Europeanisation
of domestic politics, public spheres and political identities,
and the politicisation of EU affairs seem to be not only reflexive and
complementary processes, but also desirable from democratic point
of view. When the public sphere is lacking and the political sphere is
opaque, the citizens, deprived of the chance to adopt any precise political
orientation, can only regard the political regime with growing
disengagement and distrust, which can contribute to the construction
of passive borders. Empirical findings suggest that we can observe the
gradual emergence of Europeanised public spheres which provide sites
where Europeanised identities (including the sceptical ones) are con-
structed.81
Although such development remains uneven, the EU seems
to be the community of communication in the making. Further politicisation
of the EU might deepen these tendencies although it remains
to be seen how much of the politicisation the EU can absorb in order
to keep containing vicious forces of ethnic nationalisms. Furthermore,
thorough interpretation of preconditions supporting and treating active
borders remains an important task for both theoretical analysis
25
European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
and empirical research.
***
Acknowledgments:
The author would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the support
provided by grant MSM6138439909 Governance in the context of
globalising economy and society of Faculty of International Relations,
University of Economics in Prague.
Karel B. Müller is affiliated to the Department of Political Science in
the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Economics
in Prague, the Czech Republic. He may be reached at: mullerk@vse.cz
Notes
1	 Ruzza, Carlo and Emanuela Bozzini (2008), ‘Organised Civil Society and
European Governance: Routes of Contestation,’  European Political Sci-
ence, 7:3, pp. 296-303.
2	 Müller, Karel B. (2006), ‘The Civil Society-State Relationship in
Contemporary Discourse: A Complementary Account from Giddens’
Perspektive,’ The British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 8:2, pp. 311-330..
3	 Risse, Thomas (2010), A Community of Europeans? Transnational
Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca/London: Cornell University
Press.
4	 Habermas, Jürgen (2001), The Postnational Constellation: Political
Essays. Cambridge: Polity Press. See also Hix, Simon (2008), What
is wrong with the EU and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press.
5	 On the issues of Czechoslovak Latin-American diplomatic relatI
am aware of a dilemma between collective and individual identity
which has been addressed by many scholars including myself
(Müller, Karel B. (2007), ‘Search for a European Identity – Psycho-Sociological
Perspective. An Attempt at Agency Approach,’
Central European Journal of International & Security Studies 1:1,
pp. 100–112. Collective identity could be understood as an overlap
of individual identities. Nevertheless, identity is always a part of
subjective identity (unless we talk about ascribed or inflicted iden-
26
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1/2014
tities). By overstating the notion of collective identity we are at risk
of the methodological nationalism. In this paper I try to combine
both perspectives. When emphasizing an individual agency context
I talk about identity, when stressing a structural context I refer to
collective or political identity, although it is often impossible to
take these two contexts analytically apart.
6	 Tocqueville, Alexis de (1968), Democracy in America. New York:
Doubleday. See Müller (2006).
7	 Taylor, Charles (1990), ‘Modes of Civil Society,’ Public Culture 3:1,
pp. 95-117. See Walzer, Michael (1991), ‘The Idea of Civil Society
Disent,’ Spring, pp. 293-334.
8	 FGiddens, Anthony (1990), The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
9	 Giddens (1990).
10	 For more detailed interpretation see Müller (2006).
11	 Taylor (1990).
12	 Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham (eds) (2010), The Making of a
European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contestation.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
13	 Golding, Peter (2007), ‘Eurocrats, technocrats, and democrats –
Competing Ideologies in the European Information Society,’ European
Societies 9:5, pp. 719-734. See also Trenz, Hans-Jörg (2008),
‘In Search of European Public Sphere. Between Normative Overstretch
and Empirical Disenchantment,’ [On-line] RECON Online
Working Paper 2008/7. Available at: www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html
(accessed 05
August 2012).
14	 Hall, Stuart (1992), ‘The question of cultural identity,’ in Stuart Hall,
David Held and Tony McGrew (eds), Modernity and its Futures, p.
292. Cambridge: Polity Press.
15	 Fraser, Nancy (1999), ‘Rethinking Public Sphere: A Contribution to
the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,’ in Craig Calhoun (ed),
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, pp. 109-142. MA: MIT
Press.
16	 Alexander, Jeffrey (2006), The Civil Sphere. Oxford, NY: University
Press, p. 4.
17	 Eriksen, Erik O. and John E. Fossum (eds) (2000), Democracy in the
European Union. Integration Through Deliberation? London, NY:
Routledge.
18	 Koopmans, Ruud (2007), ‘Who inhabits the European public
sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised
Political Debate,’ European Journal of Political Research
46:2, pp. 183-210. See also Risse (2010).
19	 Habermas, Jürgen (1996), Between Facts and Norms: Contribution
to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press. See also Fraser (1999).
20	 Calhoun, Craig (1995), Critical Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, p.
27
European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
233.
21	 Fraser (1999), p. 126.
22	 Fraser (1999), p. 124.
23	 Tocqueville (1968).
24	 Fraser (1999), p. 123.
25	 Habermas (1996), p. 306.
26	 Eder, Klaus and Cathleen Kantner (2000), ‘Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen
in Europa: Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentichkeitsdefizit,’
in Maurizio Bach (ed) Die Europäisierung nationaler
Gesellschaften: Sonderheft 40 Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie
und Sozialpsychologie, pp. 306-331. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher
Verlag.
27	 Fraser (1999), p. 123.
28	 Risse (2010), p. 19.
29	 Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Sophia (2007), ‘The missing European public
sphere and the absence of imagined European citizenship – Democratic
deficit as a function of a common European media deficit,’
European Societies 9:5, pp. 685-704. See also Neverla, Irene (2007),
‘The Birth of a European Public Sphere Through European Media
Reporting of Risk Communication,’ European Societies 9:5, pp.
705-718, or Trenz (2008).
30	 Koopmans and Statham (2010).
31	 See Risse (2010), see also Trenz (2008).
32	 Risse (2010), p. 136.
33	 Golding (2007). See also Mörä, Tuomo (2008), ‘Ideals of European
Public Sphere and the EU Journalism,’ Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas
3:23, pp. 86-98..
34	 Kaitatzi-Whitlock (2007).
35	 Koopmans and Statham (2010).
36	 Neverla (2007).
37	 Koopmans and Statham (2010).
38	 Risse (2010), p. 126.
39	 Risse (2010), p. 121.
40	 Risse (2010), p. 123.
41	 Risse (2010), p. 120.
42	 Offe, Claus (2011), ‘Innovation of Liberal Democracy: Can Deliberation
be Institutionalised?,’ Czech Sociological Review 47:3, pp.
447-472.
43	 Risse (2010), p. 171.
44	 Delanty Gerard (2011), ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospect
of cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters,’ The British
Journal of Sociology 62:4, pp. 633-656
45	 Shils, Edward (1975), Center and Periphery. Essays in Macro-Sociology.
Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 111-126.
46	 The concept was introduced by Erik Erikson whose lifelong research
shows that the common strand in human nature consists in
striving for an (positive) identity based on two elements. The first is
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competence in productive, social, and personal relations. The second
rests on a sense of integrity within a sensible world of meaning.
The inability to assert our competence and to be an integral
part of a community causes the identity crises. See Hoover, Keith
(1997), The Power of Identity. Politics in a New Key. Chatham. N.J.:
Chatham, p. 66.
47	 For more see Müller (2007).
48	 Eriksen and Fossum (2000).
49	 Gellner, Ernest (1998), Nationalism. New York: New York University
Press.
50	 Risse (2010).
51	 Risse (2010), p. 85.
52	 Risse (2010) chapter 3.
53	 Risse (2010), p. 245.
54	 Pichler, Florian (2009), ‘Cosmopolitan Europe: View and Identities,’
European Societies 11:1, pp. 3-24. See also Risse (2010), p. 61.
55	 Risse (2010), p. 91.
56	 Giddens (1990). p. 156.
57	 Habermas (2001).
58	 Outhwaite, William (2008), European Society. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
59	 Castells, Manuel (2001), The Internet Galaxy. Reflection on the Internet,
Business, and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
60	 Hall (1996). Hall, Stuart (1996), ‘Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’?,’
in S. Hall, P. du Gay (eds), Question of Cultural Identity, pp.
1-17, London: Sage, p. 4.
61	 Risse (2010), pp. 10-11.
62	 Habermas (2001). See also Hix (2008), or Přibáň, Jiří (2007), Legal
Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity. Aldershort: Ashgate
Publishing.
63	 Müller, Karel B. and Marek Skovajsa (2009), ‘From Reflections on
Post- Communism to Perspectives on Europeanization: Democracy
and Civil Society in Central Europe,’ International Political Science
Review 30:5, pp. 501-517.
64	 Habermas, Jürgen (1989),  The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
65	 Sztompka, Piotr (1998), ‘Mistrusting Civility: Predicament of a
Post-Communist Society,’ in Jeffrey Alexander (ed), Real Civil Societies.
Dilemmas of Institutionalization, pp. 191 – 210. London,
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage.
66	 Müller and Skovajsa (2009).
67	 This comparison does not in any way imply that one can interpret
the normative likelihood between communist regimes and the EU.
The parallel made of these two very different systems merely seeks
to interpret certain structural (and very interesting) similarities of
dynamics in determining formation of the public sphere and col-
29
European
Civil Society’s
Conundrum
lective identities in these two otherwise very essentially different
political regimes, similarities that can be in generic terms described
as deficit of political modernity.
68	 See Hix (2008), and Risse (2010), p. 245.
69	 Risse (2010), p. 240.
70	 Risse (2010), p. 248.
71	 Přibáň (2007).
72	 Přibáň (2007).
73	 Habermas (1989).
74	 Risse (2010), p. 246.
75	 Risse (2010), p. 238.
76	 Schmidt, Vivien (2006), Democracy in Europe. The EU and National
Polities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5..
77	 Risse (2010), p. 227.
78	 Hix (2008).
79	 Such as Hix (2008), Mörä (2008), Přibáň (2007).
80	 Risse (2010).
81	 Risse (2010).